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Deportation, smart borders and mobile citizens: Using digital methods 
and traditional police activities to deport EU citizens 
 
Taking the case of Romanian citizens in France, this article documents and analyses the digital 
methods and traditional police activities used for the deportation of EU citizens across the 
Schengen border and within EU territory. EU laws and Schengen regulations support states’ 
implementation of high-tech methods in migration governance and police work. Our fieldwork, 
conducted with several police units in France and Romania, indicates a gap between the 
claimed ‘controlled’ management of mobility through crimmigration and the actual messiness 
at the Schengen border as a result of policy implementation limitations (lack of legislative 
adjustment to digital demands), poor administration (training of border agents, allocating 
resources) and political decisions (harmonisation or competing narratives). Despite the 
promotion of cutting-edge technologies in the deportation process, traditional techniques as 
well as paperwork remain relevant. This raises questions regarding the articulations of 
traditional techniques with highly promoted control technologies. While the latter has 
modified the functioning of the deportation process, these changes do not necessarily make 
the former useless. In practice, this work is left to the discretion of police officers and ground-
level bureaucrats who interpret, create and enforce norms and regulations in the name of ‘the 
rule of law’. 
 





Two phenomena have encouraged policies of strengthening the EU border regime: the 
inclusion of East European countries in the EU (Scott 2016; van Houtum and Pijpers 
2007), and the so-called ‘crisis of migration’. These have led to a growing investment in 
soft power as a mean of controlling EU frontiers (Dijstelbloem and Meijer 2011; Guild 
and Carrera 2013; Lehtonen and Aalto 2017). The Eastern enlargement and integration 
processes and the reinforcement of Europe’s external borders have the effect of re-
territorialising borders in the EU (Marcu 2016; Amilhat-Szary and Giraut 2015). The 
implementation of ‘EU smart borders’ programs for EU external border control now 
informs policies, tactics and strategies for managing migration. The ‘crisis’ in migration 
management shifts politics towards the criminalization of foreign nationals and the 
reinforcement of border control with high-tech police work and detention facilities 
(Bosworth et al. 2018; Hasselberg 2016). In particular, border control has increasingly 
become a domain of criminal law enforcement (Aliverti and Bosworth 2017; Eagly 
2017), where border police or related agencies execute migration control activities 
along the lines of race, citizenship, gender and neo-colonial relations of power (Weber 
and McCulloch 2018). Crimmigration at the border, shaped by the workings of state 
agents as well as by digital technologies and data collection, contributes to the 
expansion of police power beyond the state laws (Brouwer et al. 2017; Zedner 2019). 
Scholars have shown how ‘the space of legality determining the irregularity of the 
foreigner is no longer so central at times of justifying controls and surveillance’ (Carrera 
and Hernanz 2015, 77), and that, paradoxically, any foreigner becomes a potential over-
stayer, criminal or illegal immigrant. At the same time, as the EU fortifies and 
strengthens police forces on its external borders it also suffers a ‘centripetal’ effect in 
the form of increased policing, control and surveillance of its own population (van Baar 
2014).  
This article questions and problematizes the use of digital technologies and non-
digital methods in policing EU citizens and alleged foreign criminals on French territory 
and across the internal Schengen border in Romania.i It analyses the practices of public 
servants and police officers in France and in Romania, who selectively use paper-based 
and digital documents in their daily work. From police surveillance and deportation 
practices in France to the operating data of the national police and Schengen 
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Information System (SIS II) programs at the Romanian border, conventional and digital-
based methods merge in policing practices geared towards the deportation of EU 
citizens. The selective usage of analogue techniques, bureaucratic rules and digital 
technologies is left to the discretion of police officers and ground-level bureaucrats 
who interpret, create and enforce norms and regulations in the name of ‘the rule of 
law’ (Sklansky 2012; Zacka 2017).  
Focusing on the role of digital technologies in managing mobility in France and 
deportation at the intra-Schengen borders and across EU territory, this article 
addresses the following questions: How do street-level bureaucrats and police officers 
use digital tools when they work for/against the deportation apparatus? How is policing 
affected by the application of digital tools against allegedly irregular mobile EU citizens?  
This article aims to provide insights into Franco-Romanian police institutional 
collaboration and individual discretionary power in using digital tools and paper-based 
documents while dealing with deportable/deported Romanian citizens. In the first 
section we pin down the theoretical framework that allows us to analyse our complex 
and multi-sited fieldwork. We explain the relation between crimmigration (Stumpf 
2006) and smart borders in the context of deportation processes to emphasize a new 
understanding of the state, policing and mobility. Next to the literature debates, we 
give a full account of the research methodology. In the following section we lay out our 
empirical data. We contextualize the collaboration between France and Romania, 
pointing to how France’s interest in deporting Roma ethnics requires maintaining good 
relations with Romania. Then, we describe the procedures and challenges that the 
Romanian border police face at the internal Schengen border, where deported 
Romanian citizens arrive. In the fourth section, we present a synthesis of the two 
previous empirical explorations, pointing to the distance between actual practices 
mixing traditional work and digital methods, and expectations that work practices will 
be transformed in order to implement smart border-related practices that put digital 
tools at the core of deportation procedures.  
 
1. Smart borders and crimmigration: A new way of questioning mobility 
A recent and significant body of literature addresses the usage and interference of 
digital tools in police practice (Frois and Machado 2016; Rogers and Scally 2018; Bullock 
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2018). It also makes recommendations for how the technologies should be regulated, 
both at the national and international level (Koops 2006). Specifically, scholarly debate 
on the topic of digital technologies engages in border studies and global policing 
literature by emphasizing the role of technologies in managing irregular migration 
(Andersson 2016; Casella-Colombeau 2019). On the one hand, despite the 
development of digital and biometric tools for controlling borders and the movement 
of people from and to Europe (Sontowski 2018), nation-states preserve competing 
political narratives on assimilation, harmonization and compliance with international 
norms on border security (Eule et al. 2017; Slominski and Trauner 2018). On the other 
hand, literature on policing has emphasized the growing role of technological devices, 
especially CCTV (closed-circuit television) and DNA databases, in the modernization and 
development of policing activities around the world (Frois and Machado 2016). While 
scholarship on migration and mobility has tackled the role of technology for people on 
the move and how they interact with digital tools (Oiarzabal and Reips 2012; Dekker et 
al. 2016; Nedelcu and Soysuren 2020), we focus on state practices of operating 
paperwork and advanced technologies within the deportation process (Walters 2018), 
and interrogate the (racist) ideology behind the ways in which technologies are put into 
practice in managing intra-EU mobility (Dijstelbloem and Broeders 2015).   
Scholars pay increasing attention to the policing of ‘irregular’ migrants and poor 
mobile citizens as a form of internal border control with the end goal of bureaucratic 
exclusion and deportation (Kalir 2019). Studies have focused on the ways in which 
states apply a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants (Andrews 2017), and how 
migration laws are immersed in the police practice of ‘stop and search’ and ethnic 
profiling (Aliverti 2019; Kiani and Purkhaghan 2016; Parmar 2019). In explaining 
migration management through border control and security, scholars have tackled the 
issue of re-bordering Europe while implementing e-borders and the control of 
movement through practices of classifying and categorizing mobilities (Carrera and 
Hernanz 2015; van der Woude 2018). The externalization of borders changed the 
nature and composition of border security, stimulating investment in strengthening 
borders with new technologies of e-borders. At the same time, the proliferation of 
state-to-state cooperation and practices of operating on another state territory with 
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the purpose of controlling migration have proved an efficient means of consolidating 
border control in Europe (Vrăbiescu 2019c).  
EU smart borders transform surveillance and control. Carrera and Hernanz 
(2015) discuss the ‘EU smart borders’ legislation that is materialized in the Entry/Exit 
system and Registered Travellers Programme. These technologies have changed the 
traditional ways in which mobility and identity control are carried out in the Schengen 
area, and they heralded a shift from controlling ‘unwanted irregular immigrants’ to 
recording and categorizing any foreigner crossing the border with the ‘generalized 
suspicion of future irregularity of stay in Schengen’ (Carrera and Hernanz 2015, 80). 
Bigo et al. (2012, 37) argue that in addition to ‘automated data collection and 
processing at border-crossing points, the concept of “smart borders” also encompasses 
the introduction of detection technologies aimed more broadly at preventing 
unauthorised entry and residence’. As technologies work for deterrence rather than as 
an absolute security provider, EU smart borders direct much mistrust towards the 
traveller, the foreigner who crosses the border. In addition, biometric surveillance 
augments the power of border guards, allowing suspicion to be played out in the case 
of the EU citizen border crosser.  
Smart borders and new technologies also transform practices and behaviors at 
the border. Allen et al. (2017) show how the assemblage of conditions, objects, 
institutions, laws and agents determines the ways in which technologies are used at 
the border (Scheel 2019). The e-borders became the organizing condition for 
understanding how technologies, data and human decisions relate to one another. At 
the same time, the shifting of EU border control towards a centralized police 
organization across Europe challenges practices at the borders: e-borders collect, 
analyse and provide data on individuals. This procedure should respect nation-state 
legislation on the protection of data, while encouraging the transnational 
harmonization of policing.  
The Return Directive (2008/115/EC), Schengen Agreement and the Dublin III 
Regulation represent the EU legal framework for enabling the deportation of migrants, 
including within the EU territory. Police practices at the EU border are anticipated to 
merge towards a common structure that makes use of the large-scale data and control 
technologies used in managing border security. Karanja (2008) teases out how data use 
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for border control is limited by national data protection laws, and thus the Schengen 
system cannot be used as much as international police organizations would initially 
have intended. The Schengen system emphasizes the shift from national authority over 
mobile subjects towards international mechanisms for large-scale data analysis. 
However, technologies acquired by each member state face different stages of 
implementation, and border security procedures still lack harmonization (Hampshire 
2016).  
 
2. Methodological framework and the Franco-Romanian case study 
This article is based on polymorphous engagement and multi-sited fieldwork 
(Gusterson 1997) conducted in France and Romania over eight months between 2016-
2017. The research focused on the deportation apparatus, which includes state 
institutions, NGOs, judges, lawyers, interpreters, private actors and independent 
individuals. The methodological complexity of obtaining access to fieldwork, research 
design and data gathering has been insightfully discussed (Vrăbiescu 2019b). Out of rich 
data, we focus here on the practices and usage of technologies in the daily work of 
police officers and civil servants.  
We explore data gathered from the French police liaison officers and the border 
police officers at the Otopeni Airport in Bucharest where the deported Romanian 
citizens arrive. In France, we conducted twelve interviews and two focus groups with 
Romanian liaison police officers. We draw upon field notes from one day of participant 
observation at a police station in France, two interviews with representatives of the 
French police in Romania, and four with high-ranked civil servants in the Ministry for 
the Interior and prefectures. In Bucharest, we had three meetings with high-ranked 
officers in the Ministry of Interior and police organizations; we did six days of 
participant observation at the border police unit in Otopeni (the main aerial entry point 
into the Romanian territory), and we also collected eight interviews (out of which one 
interviewee was female) with border police officers and agents.  
Importantly, this article points to the approach of French and Romanian 
authorities when dealing with deportable Romanian citizens, mainly of Roma ethnicity. 
France deports Romanians on the basis of their citizenship, grounding its arguments in 
the irregularity of their intra-EU mobility, but the background of identifying them as 
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such entails a more complex system of racialized state practices and categorization 
(Vrăbiescu 2019a, 2020). Governing the mobility of EU citizens through evictions and 
deportations permits what otherwise might be considered futile police action and 
reveals the limits of the EU principle of the freedom of movement. In fact, the 
securitization of Roma ethnics led to a sustained campaign of camp evictions in which 
populations designated as ‘Roma’ by the French government were targeted first for 
‘voluntary’ return programs, then for the regular issuing of deportation ordersii (Ram 
2014). France’s actions were contested by NGOs who petitioned against discriminatory 
policies against Roma, but never got any legal or political support from the EU 
(EC/837/2013, PE/578/2015).  
Under this constellation, the particularity of the Schengen border within the EU 
territory needs further explanation. Romania is a non-Schengen EU state that is 
allegedly in compliance with technical requirements (Pascouau 2014; McCabe 2016; EC 
Report 2017), border legislation and the implementation of the integrated system of 
data sharing (Cornelisse 2014). The Schengen agreement requires states to fulfil socio-
political and economic standards to be able to implement technological and procedural 
harmonization at the EU external borders (Alkopher and Blanc 2016; Kasparek 2016). It 
encourages transnational police collaboration and the reinforcement of external 
border control (Geyer 2016). Transnational police collaboration focuses on alliances for 
border surveillance at the Schengen border as a point of entrance, and cooperation in 
criminal justice matters (Lukic 2016; Meško 2017). In addition, the transnational police 
framework for collaboration facilitates joint missions of national police structures 
(within EUROPOL and INTERPOL) and contributes to a common police force such as 
FRONTEX.  
 
3. Selective use of technologies in the territory and across the borders: Insights from 
research data 
Insights from the Franco-Romanian case reveal the dynamics between different forms 
of administrative exclusion and the procedures deployed at the intra-EU Schengen 
borders. These administrative processes initiated in France against mobile EU citizens, 
such as Romanians, have consequences at the intra-EU Schengen border, namely 
reifying it and highlighting its importance for deportation. Nevertheless, procedures of 
	 9	
administrative exclusion meet no opposition at the Romanian EU-Schengen border, but 
rather activate an increased policing of the deportees who are Romanian nationals. The 
following sub-sections will demonstrate the entanglement of two policing practices 
against mobile EU citizens: on the French territory and at the intra-EU Schengen border 
in Romania. 
 
3.1. From paperwork to digital record: excluding the unwanted citizen 
The empirical data show that police criminal procedures are contentiously entangled 
with new technologies for identification, control and regulation within the deportation 
process. The random policing allows officers to use several tools to identify criminals 
and suspect mobile citizens. This provokes inevitable frictions between the usage of 
traditional methods and digital tools of control. One can consider these frictions as 
change markers or indicators towards more ‘technological’ deportation processes, but 
they do not necessarily foretell the disappearance of ‘traditional’ techniques. These 
frictions suggest that structural factors, rather than random contingencies, facilitate 
the deportation of poor EU citizens. Instead of random acts such as racist profiling in 
police work or the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats, this study shows the 
relevance of structural violence against EU citizens, such as the decision by the 
prefecture to issue deportation orders and administrative interdiction (IAT).iii  
Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of EU citizens and their family members to 
move and reside freely in the territory of member states forbids the automatic 
expulsion of EU citizens. In France, state practices of the eviction and expulsion of 
Romanian citizens apply technologies to the purpose of recording, categorizing and 
policing. The French police prefer digital tools over paper-mediated documentation, 
viewing them as easier to use and more efficient. However, paperwork and paper-
mediated documents remain essential for building cases against Romanian citizens in 
France.  
France privileges an administrative path to facilitate migrants’ deportation to 
Romania over pursuing criminal charges. In addition, the increased work involved in 
policing foreign petty criminals motivates the authorities to push them through the 
administrative system with the aim of deportation. Deportation is the ultimate 
outcome of the administrative decision of exclusion that require police activities of 
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controlling, identifying and arresting deportable migrants. To achieve this, institutions 
manipulate technologies that play an important role in enabling police work, restricting 
the communication and mobility of destitute EU citizens and facilitating deportation. 
State investment in building the ‘administrative file’ of targeted Romanians is indicative 
of the efforts that the authorities will go to in order to deport EU citizens while avoiding 
the criminal justice system (by law, a convicted criminal should be incarcerated and/or 
released on French territory).  
The French authorities deploy strategies of policing ‘irregular’ Romanian 
citizens on the streets and in ‘Roma camps,’ administratively detaining people who are 
accused of misdemeanours but who have not been convicted, and deporting these 
suspicious EU citizens across the Schengen border in the same way as any other third-
country national. The well-known state-led securitization of Roma migrants has 
maintained and reinforced forms of exclusion of vulnerable migrants, as well as 
recurrent practices of issuing on-the-spot of deportation orders. Each eviction has a 
direct consequence for migrants’ mobility, forcing people to leave French territory or 
risk being detained (deportation order with delay). Romanian citizens are often 
deported for petty criminality without a criminal conviction. In doing so, the French 
state sometimes does not use advanced technologies for recording, communicating 
and policing deportable EU citizens to facilitate their deportation.  
Fischer and Darley note that ‘the administrative control of foreigners on one hand 
and the management of the criminally delinquent on the other, although 
differentiated, were never totally separated’ (2010, 7). Administrative penaltiesiv are 
more efficient than criminal sentences, despite that the former require a high 
investment in building up administrative files, which include creating both digital and 
paper records, and risk being contested in (administrative) court.v By limiting the usage 
of technologies in the work of police and constructing an administrative non-penal 
indictment, the state records a high ‘number’ of ‘closed cases’ representing EU 
deportees. Their files go into administrative rather than criminal procedures. 
Nonetheless, these procedures, which incur high costs in terms of financial and 
bureaucratic investments, are far less costly than pursuing the migrant in the criminal 
justice system (El Qadim 2014). Moreover, the digital files still belong to different 
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organizations controlling European borders: the border police and the international SIS 
database.  
French authorities use digital tools to justify their requests for more police 
funding in order to address terrorist threats, migration control and foreign criminality. 
One of the outcomes of this funding is the bilateral police collaboration with Romania 
(Vrăbiescu 2019c), a project aimed at the identification and control of potential foreign 
criminals. Romanian police forces acting on French territory help to impose restrictive 
legislation on intra-EU mobility and to racialize police methods by targeting Roma 
ethnics when identifying Romanian citizens. This French model of in-country policing of 
EU citizens targets Roma ethnics and poor migrants from Romania (GISTI 2008; Nedelcu 
and Ciobanu 2016). France’s investment in digital tools to fight criminality is doubled in 
the form of increased human capital who apply traditional police work to identify 
foreign criminals and deport unwanted EU citizens.  
The bilateral police collaboration to detect and identify irregular migrants in a 
nation-state territory is a matter of one-to-one state collaboration. Meško (2017, 113) 
explains that direct, bilateral and multilateral police cooperation acts on ‘an exchange 
of information and data, and operational measures for the prevention, detection, and 
investigation of criminal offences,’ thus prioritizing the use of criminal records in direct 
police collaboration. The specificity of the Franco-Romanian bilateral collaboration 
introduces new elements of selective and flexible use of technologies in police work. 
This alliance has the task of, among other operations, identifying and controlling 
Romanian citizens on French territory. This includes two complementary activities of 
policing: surveillance of Roma camps, and identifying people within the national police 
database. The legality and efficiency of using digital technologies in police work do not 
always overlap. Some officers find it practical and fulfilling to use surveillance methods 
in the traditional way, explaining how the quality and competence of their work comes 
from their training, experience and skills in exercising police work. They often told me 
how their preferred method for surveillance of Roma camps, a procedure involving 
hiding, watching and identifying a person, brings them considerable work satisfaction.  
Despite serious investment on the part of both states, control technologies such 
as fingerprinting, photographing and taking other biometrical data from petty criminals 
have allegedly been dropped (fieldnotes 2016). Instead, liaison officers apply operative 
	 12	
activities of policing, such as surveillance of Roma camps or interviewing Romanian 
citizens accused of criminal activity at the police station. The police’s digital tools enable 
the process of identification of Romanian citizens. These processes serve to match data 
about a person at the police station in France with the database in Romania. With the 
help of liaison officers, data is collected in France and compared with the database in 
Romania. Sometimes identifying recidivists is relatively easy if an officer has experience 
in looking through the files and matching an individual’s characteristics, but the process 
can be often unsuccessful if the Romanian citizen has no police record in Romania.  
One Romanian officer complained during our interview that the procedure of 
taking photos and fingerprints of all the Roma migrants who were targeted for 
voluntary return programs had been abandoned: ‘With fingerprinting was different. It 
is a pity that this procedure stopped. It was very useful.’ Supposedly the procedure was 
not a police-oriented one, but was used by the French state to identify Romanian 
citizens who had already benefited from the ‘aid for return’ policy. Yet, as we were to 
learn, the procedure of taking photos and fingerprints is still in use. The Romanian 
citizens who are stopped and searched by the police were fingerprinted first at the 
police station and once again at the immigration detention centre, a practice that is 
legal only for foreigners who are pursued in the criminal court of justice.  
This transnational collaboration opens up questions about the effects of 
deportation procedures at the receiving end, when the Romanian citizen crosses the 
intra-European Schengen border to his/her country of origin. The practices of 
recording, communicating and sharing data are made available to different police 
structures. At the same time, these practices of blurred legality leave space for the 
discretion of police officers from France and Romania to assess and produce different 
forms of criminalization of mobile EU citizens. Similarly, recent literature suggests that 
coercive border control increasingly produces ‘porous boundaries between the civil, 
administrative and criminal fields’ (Weber and McCulloch 2018, 3), a theoretical line 
that we follow.  
 
3.2. Messiness at the internal Schengen border  
Our empirical data show precisely that the state’s political decision for deportation 
stands out as contrary to the EU’s claimed need for high tech control at the border. 
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Bureaucracy works against the ideals of efficiency and result-oriented policy that 
includes police standard missions of chasing and identifying human trafficking across 
the borders. By contrast, one of the unsettling activities of the border police at the 
intra-EU Schengen border is the procedure of receiving Romanian nationals who have 
been deported from another EU country. In their daily work, border police officers work 
with the idea of criminal deportees instead of returned migrants, despite the fact that 
no criminal records or judicial trial exists. The terminology has changed in recent years: 
before 2007, deported Romanian citizens were referred to as ‘expelled,’ and now they 
are referred to as ‘returned.’ ‘[B]ut even if the naming is different, the practice 
remained the same,’ explained a chief officer at the airport.  
Digitalised data at the Schengen border categorises deported persons as 
returnees, sent back, expelled, extradited, or put in Dublin procedures.vi This data is 
manipulated according to Romanian border practices and regulations and in agreement 
with the Schengen Borders Code. For each category there is another type of digital file 
to be filled in the SIS II (field notes, December 2016). Each deported national has a file 
in which, besides the deportation grounds of residency status irregularity, an alleged 
felony (the person has nonetheless not been judged or condemned) is marked. For the 
digital system there are no ‘clear’ returnees. If someone is deported, it is assumed that 
they must have done something wrong. In the case of EU citizens who enjoy the right 
of freedom of movement, this ‘wrong’ is straightforwardly associated with criminality. 
Like convicted criminals, deportees are registered in the SIS database, where the 
severity of the felony is recorded only by its assignment to one of the twenty sub-
categories of crimes. If necessary, the data are processed and analysed afterwards by 
the Romanian Border Police headquarters. However, the ways in which the recordings 
are done and how the digital files are filled in depends on each of the agents working 
in the back office.  
The back office of the border police in Otopeni was a small booth with a glass window 
that allowed just enough space for somebody to squeeze through documents and 
hear the officer’s questions (although the office door was permanently open). Marin, 
the officer in charge of returnees on the day of our interviews, bluntly introduced me 
to his job by cracking a joke: ‘They come in envelopes,’ meaning the envelops that 
hold the ID documents of Romanian returnees. Marin’s job is to check national police 
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registers and international databases, such as SIS or EURODAC, match the identities 
of the returnees and check whether they have any conviction or an open prosecution 
case. Then he interviews the returnee, he says because ‘there are many that are not 
telling the truth.’ Willing to provide details about his tasks, Marin continued, ‘Look, 
today there were four pieces… sorry, people’ he stated with a short, complicit smile. 
Then he continued, ‘these four men arrived from Denmark and inside each envelop 
there was the ID card of the guy and a 10-page document from the Danish authorities 
that nobody knew which authority was—border police, national police, judicial 
authority?’ He picked up an opened envelop from the left side of his desk and gave 
it to me. ‘Have a look! You read and tell me what they say.’ Everything was in Danish 
except the first page written in English. We tried to understand the written standard 
form with no details about the institution who issued it, nor about the reasons for 
the deportation. The ink intervention was a checked box for ‘without escort’ and the 
stamp with the name of the police agent who prepared the forms. The other pages 
were non-readable for somebody who does not speak Danish. Marin explained to me 
how, during their short interview, two of the deportees confessed that they were 
caught while shoplifting. He did not remember what the other two claimed they did. 
They were verified in the national police databases and then let free, as their 
misdemeanours were not on Romanian national territory. In a bitter tone, Marin 
concluded: ‘All of them are clean.’ (field notes, December 2016) 
A deported Romanian citizen is accompanied by a paper file that comes in the envelope 
the border agents receive. Files from France usually consist of 10-12 pages that are 
filled in with text justifying every step the French state took in the deportation process. 
Pages filled with signatures, stamps and dates from several institutions such as the 
Prefecture de Police,vii administrative and judicial judges, interpreters, lawyers, and so 
on contain all the trials, processes and decisions that were taken to deport that person. 
The issuing of massive documents by the deporting state encounters the Romanian 
border police practice of literally throwing the paper files into the garbage. 
The oversized paper documentation—a sort of reproduction and material 
evidence of the ‘real’ and digital world of decisions—ends up being irrelevant. The 
materiality of these documents, if not doubled by the digital communication of data, 
remains unknown, invisible and useless outside the Schengen area, i.e. for the 
Romanian police. Clarifying the modern relation between paper and digital files, 
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Matthew Hull (2012, 262) reflects on the ‘understanding of paper-mediated 
documentation [that] can help us recognize the genuine novelty and the continuity of 
electronic technologies, both of which are sometimes obscured by ahistorical rhetoric 
of technological revolution.’ Paper-mediated documentation challenges the 
implementation procedures of deportation, whereas the practices at the border 
challenge the efficacy of Schengen regulations. Besides, the relations established 
between different border police structures across Schengen borders reveals the 
usefulness of ‘mis’-communication processes and information exchange in 
bureaucracies (Borrelli 2018). On the one hand, paper-mediated documentation 
facilitates the communication between the deporting state and air operator rather 
than the receiving state. On the other hand, deportation has the political agreement of 
the receiving state, even when communication between institutions is not working 
properly. Yet, practices at the border show a hierarchical relation between two 
European states that may avoid Schengen regulation, and also demonstrate the ways 
in which the intra-EU border gets reinforced by the practices of deportation. 
The French police in Romania receive data issued by the Border Police in France 
in the form of a digital file on the deportee (routing) that states the offences they 
committed in France, their convictions, and if the person is accompanied by an escort 
or not. This ‘routing’ includes also the confirmation that the deportation has been 
executed by the French Border Police, the moment the flight takes off with the 
deportee on board. At the other end, the Romanian aerial border is the entrance point 
of the deportee in the Romanian territory. The French police representative illustrated 
the process of arriving ‘at home’ (see also Kalir 2017) by saying: 
There is an average of 350-360 people per month deported from France to Romania. 
In general they come without escort, meaning the Romanian citizens come here at 
home (my emphasis). They are not necessarily… maybe they are encountered by the 
Romanian border police, because the Romanian Border Police has the routing and 
they know when a person is sent from France. They are controlled by the Border 
Police, I mean it’s a Romanian citizen who did nothing in his country. This is what 
happens: he comes and because he’s not happy he leaves. And then, they do the 
same. But when there is somebody deported with escort, then the person is handed 
to the Romanian authorities.  
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However, the practices of French and Romanian border police and liaison officers 
allowed me to observe that the digital ‘routing’ was often not known to the Romanian 
Border Police, nor were the relevant regulations respected. Differences remain 
between the expected goal of harmonization of police practices and the daily work at 
the air border. Border officers confront material shortages on a daily basis, an issue 
affecting both their paperwork and the digital lives of ‘deportees’. 
Nonetheless, receiving deportees who are handled by ‘office work’ at the 
border justifies the implementation of a harmonized system of policing EU borders. For 
example, when a deported Romanian citizen arrives at the airport without an escort, 
the airline that transport them should accompany them to the Romanian authorities 
and deliver them the deportee’s travel documents. Some air companies call the back 
office to announce the arrival of the deportee, but let people roam free in the airport 
and also give them their ID cards. No international law lays down how deported persons 
should be handed over, other than the obligation of the state to accept their own 
citizens.viii However, at the airport a national regulation sets the rules, but not all the 
airlines comply, nor there is any sanction for not doing so.  
One officer explained to me that it is not at all unusual for companies to not 
comply with the regulations: ‘sometimes even the company gives them the documents 
and then… [you have to] run after them!,’ meaning that the border police should find 
them and not just let them go through the border zone where the actual check is done. 
When this happens, the officer on duty writes down the deportee’s name on several 
pieces of papers and runs to all the filter desks so they will pick up the deported ones 
and send them to the back office for identifying and checking procedures. Not only 
were there hilarious situations like this, but in fact this scenario was much more 
common than the proper procedure as there was only one border police agent in the 
transit zone (‘the finger’) of the whole airport. Among many other duties, this agent is 
tasked with going to the gates to pick up the returnees/deportees, which s/he rarely 
does. According to the border police, this failure is due to personnel shortage and the 
(unwritten) rule that the responsibility falls on the airline to designate a crew member. 
However, when a border police agent is not available and the airline fails to send a crew 
member to the back office, an employee from the handling company might accompany 
the deported person to the back office.  
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The experience and professionalism of border officers comes with a critique 
towards the institution’s internal regulations and practices. Reflecting on their daily 
work and the difficulties they encounter, border police officers complained to me about 
the lack of resources, bad management, insufficient regulations and poor training of 
‘new’ border agents who were about to work under Schengen requirements that 
involves merely manipulating machines and being obedient to technologies (Dunn 
2004). For the Romanian border forces, the harmonization with Schengen acquis means 
giving up the status and knowledge of police officers trained in judicial matters, and 
being substituted by border guards trained in operating digital tools. They believe that 
the future of border policing will be compromised in relation to the current EU-
Schengen exchange of expertise.  
 
4. Humans in service of technologies?  
The deported Romanians remain in EU territory. At the intra-EU Schengen border in 
Romania, they are submitted again to police procedures. This time, the messiness at 
the border is the result of the implementation of the e-border policy, abusive 
deportation practices and a lack of harmonized rules for using basic devices as well as 
new technologies. Following van der Woude et al. (2017), who argue that recent 
changes in border control on the basis of interconnectedness of crime, security and 
migration oblige us theoretically and empirically to redefine the field of study and 
better contextualise the European dimension, we aimed to explain the practices and 
consequences of this particular type of EU mobility control. Contrary to border control 
demands for digital technologies to be incorporated into crimmigration management, 
agreements between states facilitate dynamics of police and border security that are 
designed to keep suspicious individuals on record without pursuing them.  
 Reiterating the words of Matthew Hull, state documents—in the form of signed-
and-stamp paper or a digital record—may remain analytically invisible in their 
consequences if there are not considered to be ‘constitutive of bureaucratic rules’ 
(2012, 253). Paperwork and digital tools in the deportation apparatus are both co-
existing and reflect a process of adjustment to new impositions in which police officers 
and civil servants have to re-evaluate their own practices with regard to Schengen 
acquis implementation, professional expectations and the reality of infrastructure at 
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disposal. Moreover, the role of non-digital practices in digital experience is essential. It 
shows the ways in which human discretion and responsibility is embedded in the ways 
digital tools are used for surveillance, identification and control.  
Digital technologies act as an important legal instrument and a vital part of the 
harmonization mechanism that enhance efficiency in protecting EU external borders 
(Trauttmansdorff 2017). Border police and judicial authorities across Europe use 
‘datafied border surveillance networks and projects’ (Dijstelboem 2019, 312), such as 
SIS, to share data on persons or objects. While the expectation is that EU states will 
implement advanced technologies (SIS II) and harmonize police practices, competing 
national interests mean that nations mobilize different regulations and manipulate 
digital tools to maintain, promote and facilitate police practices of deportation 
designed for sovereign purposes. Thus although there is a large palette of digital tools 
available, regulations tend to either make them unusable, or fail to enable their 
practical potential. As a result, the use of these tools by the police is optional and 
selective. At the same time, the paperwork required by administrative deportation 
procedures illustrates its role in modern knowledge production and simulate control 
over the digitized police work by emphasizing the importance of material support for 
affirming authorities (Lowenkron and Ferreira 2014).  
The empirical data have shown how state practices of deportation always blend 
a mix of traditional paper work and digital methods. The nation-state is still relying on 
paper-mediated documentation rather than transitioning fully to digitized deportation 
procedures. Thus, the practices at the intra-EU border attest to the lack of efficacy of 
the Schengen regulations. This normalized messiness at the intra-EU border contradicts 
the claimed orderliness of police institutions and policing practices, demonstrating 
selectiveness, randomness and discretion distributed at different levels within police 
institutions and in their collaborations. Yet, at the intra-EU borders the expectations 
are that European states’ procedures will change, ideally leading to harmonized 
procedures among member states, in order to implement smart border-related 
practices. Moreover, digital tools deployed in border police work contribute to the 
legitimization of EU citizens’ deportation practices in the EU territory. They help to blur 
jurisdictions and the rule of law, enhance the potential of bilateral police collaboration 
while maintaining unequal state relations, and introduce new crimmigration elements. 
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They contribute to the debate advanced by Weber and McCulloch about the rise of 
‘porous boundaries between civil, administrative and criminal fields’ (2018, 3), 
questioning the ‘neutrality’ of border devices. At the same time, they reinforce the 
external borders of the EU, contributing to the narrative of a European common 
territory.  
Furthermore, extending the practices of border police into nation-state 
territory by using e-borders to further police and deport mobile citizens confirms and 
yet complements what Kalir calls ‘Departheid’, that is, ‘the combination of policies and 
practices, rationales and emotions, that force illegalized migrants to depart, be 
deported, evade deportation (by paying a tremendous price, literally and figuratively) 
or risk the ultimate removal in the form of death’ (2019, 2). Our example proves that, 
upon their arrival, the long hand of the surveillance state and deportation apparatus 
stigmatize and criminalize (again) the deported mobile citizens (re)turned to the 
territory of their own country. It advances an important topic of EU citizens’ condition, 
one that is infrequently tackled within the vast body of literature on post-deportation 
(Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015; Khosravi 2017; Schuster and Majidi 2015), and which 
could enlarge our understanding of border control. 
The communication of data across the Schengen border between France and 
Romania is bound to remain limited by the unequal status of the two EU member 
states. The border cooperation between the two states was not overly influenced by 
Romania’s accession to the EU, but mostly by the completion of the Schengen acquis. 
Although there are a few notable differences between the past and the present (before 
Romania’s EU accession), Franco-Romanian relations remain steady at the border due 
to Schengen security regulations. Smart borders are not yet in use for internally mobile 
EU citizens, at least not in a way that will result in the harmonization of legislative 
member state practices against undesirable EU citizens. However, these practices of e-
bordering applied to EU citizens amplify the idea that cross-border mobility represents 
a threat within EU territory in the form of unauthorized entry, residence or just 




Europe and its member states have invested heavily in police and security forces, 
biometric technologies and large-scale surveillance data, although on a daily basis 
border policing relies on officers’ experience, knowledge and practice. This 
demonstrates the contribution of digital technologies to the surplus deportation of 
Romanian citizens from France, and the questionable role of paperwork in the 
deportation apparatus. In short, the state introduces technologies into the deportation 
apparatus to save money and time, to be more efficient and deport more people, to be 
less accountable and to modernize. Highly regulated police procedures and the 
deportation apparatus use digital tools to respond to nation-state narratives, thus 
reminding us how technologies are deeply intertwined with the system of values, 
organizational culture and legal boundaries of our society. The installation of e-borders 
leads to the construction of any movement across borders as suspicious and potentially 
criminal activity, whereas the person-focused strategy of profiling threatens the 
principle of non-discrimination. 
The EU-Schengen framework and national laws confer enough space for police 
officers and border agents to exercise discretionary power, as illustrated also by other 
scholars (Brouwer et al. 2017; Sklansky 2012). Even when complaining about 
procedures and regulations, these officers and agents comply with internal norms and 
make sense of their work within the EU supra-state structure of security. This situated 
practice takes into consideration both legal and supra-national incentives and 
pragmatic conditions to implement digital devices in deportation processes. The 
selective use of digital tools helps police to develop and maintain informal practices, 
regardless of what happens at national and supranational levels.  
While advanced digitalization allows border police to easily record and identify 
the deportees, an ethical and procedural challenge unsettles the daily work at the 
Schengen border. During the procedure of receiving EU deportees, border police agents 
display a complete disengagement from recording procedures and abandon interest in 
police work when dealing with Romanian deportees. By interrogating institutional 
(dis)investment and public servants’ selective use of digital tools to enforce and 
enhance deportations of EU citizens, this article shows how policing poor mobile EU 
citizens becomes an integral part of state work of ‘doing borders.’ It demonstrates how 
the selective criminalization of mobile subjects at the border relies on informal social 
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practices and ultimately contributes to the state’s illegibility (Das and Pool 2004). It 
points out, in line with scholars who tackled state’s (non-)recording practices of citizens 
and aliens (Kalir and van Schendel 2017), not only state’s interest and ability to govern 
mobility by omission but also that borders are spaces of overlapping jurisdictions and 
contested legality.  
Deportation procedures recurrently strengthen the meaning of borders and 
nation-state territory. Instead of demonstrating the technological and procedural 
harmonization of police at the external borders of the EU, in the Franco-Romanian case 
the deportation of EU citizens and the practice of receiving criminalized deportees 
underscores the selective instrumentality of borders. This crimmigration at the border 
has structural effects on police practices, which are disclosed in the officers’ statements 
of disinterest, the uselessness of the paper documents and the problematic 
criminalization of deportees. It also reveals ethical issues in the usage of digital 
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i  Romania is part of the EU since 2007 and it was expected to join the Schengen area in 2014, 
which did not happen due to the opposition of some member states. However, Romania claims its 
technically readiness to join the European Border Regime by already signing the Schengen Convention 
(1990) and implementing Schengen Borders Code (regulation EC/562/2006). 	
ii  These deportation orders (OQTF or ordre de quitter le territoire français) may have a deadline 
of 30 days or can be immediately executed by the police (i.e. when those considered irregular migrants 
are put in detention centres in order to be deported).	
iii  Administrative interdiction on the territory (initially called Interdiction de circulation sur le 
territoire français) is an entry ban applicable only for EU citizens introduced with the Law 272/2016, art. 
L511-3-1/2 and further amended by the Law L214-1/2019 (Interdiction administrative du territoire). Even 
if the principle is different from the ITF (interdiction de territoire français) the effect of entry ban are the 
same: people who have an IAT (or ICTF according to CESEDA/2016) will be stopped and returned at the 
border or deported immediately when found in the French territory. To emphasize this effect of the new 
regulation, I will use ‘entry ban’ from now on (GISTI 2019).	
iv  There are two successive steps here: first it is a police measure (mesure de police) which is taken 
by the police and counts to build up an administrative assessment of the migrants; second multiple police 
measures count for an administrative decision (arrêté préfectoral) that can take to the form of deportation 
(OQTF with delay or not). 	
v  All prefectural orders, such as OQTF or IAT, can be contested in administrative court (tribunal 
administratif). In the case of Romanian citizens there is a precarious jurisprudence due to a complex 
situation (detainees’ lack of knowledge about the French system, poor NGO attendance of detained EU 
citizens, judges’ biases, etc.) that leads to different approaches depending of the courts (some accepting 
almost all the deportation orders, others canceling them). 	
vi The European Dublin III Regulation: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF under which asylum 
seekers would be returned by any member state to the EU country where they first arrived, controlled or 
asked for asylum.	
vii  Prefecture de Police is a unit of police in charge for the metropolitan area of Paris, meaning Ile-
de-France. The chief of prefecture of police has as the direct superior the minister of interior. 	
viii  The IATA convention (2010) and the following regulations do explain the rules and limits of 
duties between the deporting state and the aircraft operator. However, there are no specification on the 
duties and obligations of the air companies on the point of arrival. See also: 
https://www.icao.int/ESAF/Documents/meetings/2014/FAL-
FEB/Guidelines%20for%20the%20Removal%20of%20Deportees.pdf. In addition, for EU directives 
regarding responsibility of carriers please see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0082 and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33139. 
	
